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Intellect and the Structuring of Reality  






Though Averroes is not generally considered to be sympathetic to 
Neoplatonic thinking, there are definite parallels between the philoso-
phies of intellect of Averroes and Plotinus. Both can be considered to 
be “Idealists” in that intelligible form precedes sensible form in per-
ception, and that the material intellect of Averroes or Reason Principle 
of Plotinus, nous hylikos or pathetikos, depends in its functioning on 
the agent intellect of Averroes or Intellectual Principle of Plotinus, 
nous poietikos. The formation of the image in the oculus mentis is co-
incident with the formation of a thought, and the sensible form is a 
transient residue of the permanent intelligible form, as if it is reflected 
in a mirror and projected on a surface. For both philosophers, material 
intellect and intellect not connected to sense perception are mediated 
by a kind of intellectus in habitu, a practicing intellect which leads the 
individual to higher forms of understanding. The development of 
phantasmata or imprints of forms in the oculus mentis in the imagina-
tion or phantasia is the product of a dialectical relation between the 
mechanisms of sense perception in material intellect and an a priori 
understanding of forms in the intelligible, prior to the sensible. In or-
der to be perceived, forms must be constructed, in a structuring of re-
ality. 
 
Plotinus was born in Lycopolis circa 205 and died in Campania in 
270. Averroes, or Ibn Rushd, was born in Córdoba in 1126 and died in 
Marrakech in 1198. In the Enneads of Plotinus, I.6.3, shape is not 
something which is inherent to objects in sensual reality, but is rather 
something which is imposed upon objects by human thought, in the 
nature of geometry and ordering principles. The sensible form given 
by the material intellect connected to sense perception is already a 
product of intellection. The shape of the impression of the form of the 
object in Plotinus is something conceived, and joined to the material 
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object before it is received as an impression; the shape of the object is 
part of the a priori vocabulary by which intellect orders the sensual 
world, and reaffirms the existence of the perceiving subject in the 
world. For Plotinus, “So with the perceptive faculty: discerning in cer-
tain objects the Ideal-Form which has bound an controlled shapeless 
matter, opposed in nature to Idea, seeing further stamped upon the 
common shapes some shape excellent above the common, it gathers 
into unity what still remains fragmentary, catches it up and carries it 
within…”1 
      The form and shape which intellect imposes on bodies are mecha-
nisms of intellect in sense perception. As Averroes explains in the 
Long Commentary on the De anima, 3.1.5,2 “It is necessary to assign 
two subjects to these actually existing intelligibles,” the intelligible as 
it exists in the form of the sensory object, “one of which is the subject 
due to which the intelligibles are true, i.e., forms, which are truthful 
images, the other, the subject due to which the intelligibles are only a 
single one of the entities in the world, and this is the material intellect 
itself.” The intellect of the perceiving subject in sensory perception is 
as responsible for how the sensible world is perceived as the forms 
which are assigned to the sensible world.  
      Sense perception transfers the form of the body or material entity, 
as conceptualized, according to Plotinus, “no longer a thing of parts, 
and presents it to the Ideal-Principle as something concordant and 
congenial…” (Enneads I.6.3); the perceived form must correspond to 
the preconception of it, the intelligible form. Dianoia or discursive 
reason, actualized material intellect, described as “the reasoning-
principle in the Soul” in Enneads V.3.2, makes judgments about the 
sensible form given to it, which is already the product of judgments of 
the higher intellect, the Intellectual Principle, nous poietikos, the pres-
ence of active intellect in actualized intellect, and organizes them in 
combinations and divisions, corresponding to geometry and mathe-
matics. As the phantasmata or imprints of forms come to reasoning 
power from intellect, “reasoning will develop to wisdom where it rec-
ognizes the new and late-coming impressions (those of sense) and 
adapts them, so to speak, to those it holds from long before…,” ac-
cording to Plotinus, as in an actualized intellect or intellectus in 
habitu. Perception is the product of experience in the interaction of 
thought and the sensible world, the dialectic of the incorporeal and 
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corporeal, the universal and particular.      
      In Enneads V.3.3, if sense perception is to “develop the impres-
sion received, it distinguishes various elements in what the representa-
tive faculty has set before it,” and if it makes a judgment on the form, 
“while it has spoken on information from the senses, its total pro-
nouncement is its own…” Discursive reason in material intellect does 
nothing other than process images of forms which it has already de-
fined itself, through the relation between active intellect and material 
intellect, Intellectual Principle and Reason Principle. Without the ca-
pacity to understand the intelligible, the intelligible form in relation to 
the sensible form, material intellect can only be unaware of the reality 
of the sensible world which is perceived, and unaware of the role that 
it plays in the formation and definition of the sensible world which it 
perceives as external to itself.  
      For Plotinus there can be no immediate sense perception of an ob-
ject, without the mediation of the mirror reflection of the intelligible 
form of the object in intellect. In Enneads I.1.8, the intelligible form in 
intellect becomes the sensible form in sense perception, “not by merg-
ing into body but by giving forth, without any change in itself, images 
or likenesses of itself like one face caught by many mirrors,” in the 
same way that active intellect presents the intelligible to acquired in-
tellect. Acquired intellect is only capable of receiving the intelligible 
to the extent of its limitations, as differentiated or sequentially ar-
ranged, in the same way that the mirror is only capable of receiving an 
image according to its corporeal state, adjusted in size and position. 
      The discerning of impressions printed upon the intellect by sensa-
tion for Plotinus is the function of discursive reason, not immediate 
sense perception. Since the sensual impressions in perception are cop-
ies and derivatives of intelligible forms, perception itself is a copy and 
derivative of reason. Reason in Plotinus is composed of mnemic resi-
dues of perceived objects, what Plotinus calls “imprints” in “recollec-
tions” in Enneads V.3.2. Thoughts are propelled by the desire created 
by the multiple and fragmented images of perception as reconstructed 
in reason. In Enneads IV.7.6, sense perceptions merge together in rea-
son like lines coming together from the circumference of the circle, 
from multiplicity to unity, subject to the ruling principles. In reality, 
sense objects are variable and differentiated in terms of size and loca-
tion; they are multiple and fragmented, and it is only the reason of the 
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perceiver which allows them to be apprehended as whole and congru-
ent. Sense objects themselves cannot be immediately perceived as a 
congruent whole. Once the diverse and multiple sense objects have 
been transformed into a whole by apprehension in sense perception, 
they cannot return to their original state. Apprehension permanently 
transforms sensual reality in conformance with the principles of rea-
son.  
      Perception, according to Plotinus, divides, multiplies, and other-
wise organizes sensual reality; in other words, perception is an intel-
lective process, the most basic exercises of which are mathematics and 
geometry. Perceived objects are divided and organized into parts 
which correspond directly to the organizational capacities of reason. 
The relation of parts and subdivisions to the whole and to infinity is 
the same in the sense object as it is in reasoning capacity. Geometry 
and mathematics are the mechanisms by which sensual reality is rep-
resented by perception to reason, though sense objects do not inher-
ently contain geometrical and mathematical properties.  
      For Plotinus, discursive reason approaches nous when reason rec-
ognizes its recent sense impressions and “gathers into unity what still 
remains fragmentary, catches it up and carries it within,” the mnemic 
residues or memory traces of previous sense impressions, in a process 
of reminiscence. In the Enneads, while perception grasps the “impres-
sions printed upon the Animate by sensation” (I.1.7), through the 
mnemic residue, a perception is a mental image for that which is going 
to remember it, and the memory and the retention of the object belongs 
to the image-making power (IV.3.29), or the imagination or phantasia. 
In the representation in the mnemic residue, the intelligible form is 
present after the sensible form or perception is gone. Through mem-
ory, “every mental act is accompanied by an image,” as described in 
Enneads IV.3.30. Through the intelligible form the intellectual act is 
without parts and has not come out into the open, but remains unob-
served within, unknown to Reason Principle.  
      The function of language, or the extent to which language can 
function, is as the mirror reflection of the intellectual in discursive 
reason, in the facilitation of memory, in that, as Plotinus says, the ver-
bal expression unfolds its content and brings it out of the intellectual 
act into the image-making power, and so shows the intellectual act as 
if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence 
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and memory of it. The mechanism of perception mediates between the 
sensible world of objects in nature and the inaccessible intellectual, or 
nous, in a dialectical process between the subject and the world. There 
must be an affection which lies between the sensible and the intelligi-
ble, as Plotinus puts it, a proportional mean somehow linking the two 
extremes to each other (IV.6.1), the sensible form and the intelligible 
form. In the perception of an object, the object is already apprehended 
by the perceiving subject in relation to the perceiving mechanism, the 
construction of intellect involving the mnemic residue and the intelli-
gible form, through the use of geometry, as vision is understood in re-
lation to geometry and mathematics, the intelligible mechanisms as 
the underlying structure. 
      In the Long Commentary on the De anima 3.1.5, Averroes posits 
three intelligences in the anima rationalis or the rational soul: agent 
intellect, material or passible intellect, and speculative or actualized 
intellect, also called acquired intellect. While material intellect is 
“partly generable and corruptible, partly eternal,” corporeal and incor-
poreal, the speculative and agent intellects are purely eternal and in-
corporeal. Actualized intellect is the final entelechy, or final 
actualization of potentiality. It is a form of intellectus in habitu, which 
can be both passive and active, corporeal and incorporeal. Material in-
tellect is a possible intellect, a possibility, because it is both corporeal 
and incorporeal, thus neither corporeal nor incorporeal. Material intel-
lect becomes actualized intellect through the affect of the agent intel-
lect, which illuminates, as a First Cause, the intelligible form or forma 
imaginativa, the residue of the sensible form, the sensation, in the an-
ima rationalis. The illuminated intelligible acts on material intellect 
until material intellect becomes actualized intellect, at which point in-
tellect is able to act on the intelligible.  
      The formae imaginativae, as the basis of actualized intellect, are 
both corporeal and incorporeal; they bridge the gap or merge the two 
in the process of intellection. The formae imaginativae, like the sensa-
tions of which they are residues, are partially connected to the material 
or corporeal, and cannot be archetypes from without, but intelligibles 
within human intellect. The affect of active intellect on material intel-
lect toward actualized intellect is a combination of the illumination 
and the resulting mechanisms of intellectus in habitu. The effect is in 
the combination of the receptivity of material intellect as a passive 
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substratum of cognitive and intellectual activity, like a blank tablet, 
and the will or desire on the part of the thinking subject to develop 
cognitive and intellectual virtus. 
      In the De anima 3.1.5, the existence of intelligibles or first princi-
ples in intellect, as they are understood in actualized intellect, “does 
not simply result from the reception of the object,” the sensible form 
in sense perception in material intellect, “but consists in attention to, 
or perception of, the represented forms…,” the cognition of the forms 
in actualized intellect wherein they can be understood as intelligibles, 
which requires both the participation of active intellect and the moti-
vation of the individual for intellectual development. The goal of intel-
lectual development is to achieve union with active intellect, the final 
entelechy, and through this union the highest bliss in life can be 
achieved. Such bliss can only be achieved “in the eve of life.” 
      Material intellect, in that it is only a possibility, contains neither 
actual intellectual cognition nor a faculty for intellectual cognition. 
Both of these are only possible in actualized intellect, through intellec-
tus in habitu, acquired intellect, and the affect of agent intellect. Mate-
rial intellect contains only the possibility of being united with active 
intellect; all material intellects are equally potential. Intellectus in 
habitu is developed as the oculus mentis of the anima rationalis de-
velops a vocabulary of images or phantasmata stored in the imagina-
tio or phantasia. The phantasm, sensible form, is corporeal, and 
potentially intelligible, as the material intellect has the potential to un-
derstand the intelligible. The sensible form can only potentially be an 
intelligible form if it is predetermined by the intelligible form. In the 
De anima, 3.5.36, “this sort of action,” of the agent intellect, “which 
consists in generating intelligibles and actualizing them, exists in us 
prior to the action of the intellect,” prior to the formation of the sensi-
ble form in imaginatio. The corporeal condition of material intellect 
acts as a substrate for actualized and agent intellect, the partially and 
completely incorporeal, only as a blank tablet on which letters are 
written. The corporeal presence of the letters, the sensible form in 
phantasia, is predetermined by the writing of the letters, based on the 
idea of the letter, the intelligible form, which pre-exists the letter it-
self. 
      The passible intellect is able to distinguish and compare individual 
sensory representations, the sensible form, in the virtus aestimativa or 
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virtus cogitativa, which provides the material substrate for intellectus 
in habitu. The virtus aestimativa or virtus cogitativa might also be as-
cribed to the sensus communis, common sense. In distinguishing and 
comparing the phantasmata in imaginatio, intellect applies shape and 
form to otherwise nebulous, inchoate images. It also organizes them in 
totalities, in the most rudimentary processes of abstraction, and de-
fines them in relation to organizational systems, such as geometry and 
mathematics. Averroes suggests that the sensory powers themselves 
entail an element of intellection, in that the imprint of the sensible 
form would depend on the formation of the intelligible form. In the De 
anima 3.1.7, “the cogitative faculty,” virtus cogitativa, “belongs to the 
genus of sensible faculties. But the imaginative and the cogitative and 
the recollective” faculties, imaginatio, ratio and memoria, “all cooper-
ate in producing the image of the sensible thing, so that the separate 
rational faculty can perceive it,” as a reflected image in the oculus 
mentis, “and extract the universal intention,” the intelligible form, 
“and finally receive, i.e., comprehend it.” 
      The sensible form in the oculus mentis exists as a potential intelli-
gible, and the material intellect, which is engaged in the formation of 
the sensible form, is capable of receiving the intelligible from the ac-
tive intellect. The material intellect is the passible intellect described 
by Aristotle in De anima 3.5.430a24, which distinguishes and com-
pares the individual representations of sense experience in the oculus 
mentis. Averroes compares intellectus passibilis to phantasia or 
imaginatio, or imagination, in De anima 3.1.20, the image-making vir-
tus or power of intellect in the formation of the phatasmata of the sen-
sible form. Following Aristotle, Averroes divides material intellect 
into the sensus communis, or sense perception, the phantasia, the vir-
tus cogitativa, and memoria, in ascending order from corporeal to 
spiritual, as the active intellect is increasingly engaged. The material 
intellect cannot distinguish or apprehend intelligibles on its own. The 
material, passible intellect, is an acquired intellect, through the activi-
ties of phantasia and memoria, and it is based in the acquisition of ha-
bitual knowledge through exercise, the gymnastics of discursive 
reason, dianoia, as a material intellectus in habitu. The passible intel-
lect operates according to its capacity for receptivity, not according to 
an ability to form concepts or abstractions. 
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      Intellectual knowledge for Averroes must be distinguished from 
the habitual knowledge of passible intellect. Intellectual knowledge is 
the product of the merging of the intellectus materialis, which is con-
sidered to be incorporeal, despite its dependence on the sensible form, 
and the active intellect, which transforms the sensible form into the 
intelligible form, stripping it of its corporeal attachment and convert-
ing it from a particular to a universal, which makes the potentially in-
telligible phantasmata in the oculus mentis intelligible. The intellectus 
agens is the intellect which acts, which moves the material intellect, 
the intellect which only receives or is affected, in De anima 3.1.5. The 
active intellect allows the material intellect to be moved by imagina-
tion. The intellectus passibilis, as virtus cogitativa in combination 
with phantasia and memoria, forms the phantasm or sensible form in 
order that it can be perceived by the intellectus agens, and prepares it 
to receive the intellectus agens, by which the sensible form becomes 
the intelligible, which can be comprehended as a universal. 
      In the De anima, the transformation from potentiality to actuality 
takes place in the speculative intellect, which includes the intellectus 
in habitu, and is distinguished from the agent or productive intellect, 
intellectus agens, and the material or passible intellect, intellectus 
passibilis.3 The actualizing of the material intellect by the productive 
intellect is the result of the productive intellect illuminating the resi-
dues of sensations existing in the mind, the formae imaginativae, or 
mnemic resides. The formae act on the material intellect after they 
have been illuminated, and material intellect is transformed into spec-
ulative intellect, which combines the material and productive intel-
lects, the physical and eternal or archetypal, corporeal and incorporeal. 
The formae imaginativae themselves are both physical and archetypal, 
sensible and intelligible. 
      Averroes describes the material intellect, intellectus materialis, or 
passible intellect, as the transparent medium in relation to the intellec-
tus agens, as light. As with Plotinus, in the relation between nous and 
discursive reason, the activity of the intellectus agens must precede 
that of the intellectus materialis. In the intellectus passibilis, individ-
ual representations are distinguished, in the virtus aestimativa natu-
ralis. The material form is seen as color in relation to the light, from 
the intellectus passibilis, the intentio in the imaginative faculty, or 
phantasia. In other words, as Averroes says in De anima 3.3.18, “the 
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relation of the intentions in imagination to the material intellect is the 
same as the relation of the sensible to the senses.”4 The material intel-
lect receives the active intellect, or agent intellect, in the same way 
that transparent bodies “receive light and colors at the same time; the 
light, however, brings forth the colors” in De anima 3.5.36. The intel-
ligible form results from the cooperation of the material and agent in-
tellects.     
      As in Plotinus, when the intelligible is received by the material in-
tellect, it is subject to generation and corruption, multiplicity and acci-
dent. The intelligible form, when it is connected to the sensible form 
in material intellect, is not a permanent mnemic residue as an arche-
type, but is fluctuating and impermanent in its corporeal manifesta-
tion. But the intelligible form does not disappear when its 
corresponding sensible form does, it merely ceases to participate in the 
sensible form. In De anima 3.1.5, “And if intelligibles of this kind are 
considered, insofar as they have being simpliciter and not in respect of 
some individual,” as universals, “then it must truly be said of them 
that they have eternal being, and that they are not sometimes intelligi-
bles and sometimes not, but that they always exist in the same man-
ner…” The intelligible form can participate in the sensible form of its 
own volition, or the volition of the agent intellect, but the sensible 
form cannot participate in the intelligible form, in its corporeal limita-
tions, in the same way that color, for example, because it is tied to the 
corporeal body, cannot participate in light, although they are perceived 
simultaneously and are undifferentiated in perception.  
      According to Averroes, all individual material intellects are capa-
ble of some ability to form concepts and abstract ideas at a basic level, 
but beyond that intellectual development varies among individuals ac-
cording to the level of volition. Intelligibles are apprehended the more 
completely as knowledge of the material world is greater, as knowl-
edge of sensible objects depends on knowledge of intelligibles. Com-
plete knowledge of the material world results in complete unity 
between the material intellect and the active intellect, the final entel-
echy achieved in the “eve of life.” Knowledge and understanding are 
possible only in actualized intellect, which must no longer be potential 
intellect. Intellectual knowledge, and philosophy itself, which is eter-
nal, as an intelligible, must be seen as the ultimate goal of human life, 
and the cause of the most perfect bliss. 
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